



The Shifting Sands of Section 101 and
Section 112 Requirements for Computer
Program-Related Inventions**
This article responds to the need of attorneys to develop a strategy in preparing
and prosecuting patent protection for computer program-related inventions given
the shifting legal environment surrounding this technology in the United States.
The article is organized into two topics: (1) 35 U.S.C. section 101-statutory
subject matter, and (2) 35 U.S.C. section 112-enablement, best mode, and
means-plus-function claims. This article is not intended to be an exhaustive treat-
ment of U. S. patent law surrounding these two topics. Rather, it provides practical
tips and suggestions that will have immediate applicability to anyone interested
in obtaining patent protection directed to computer program-related inventions in
the United States.
The legal environment surrounding computer program-related inventions is
currently uncertain. The reason is twofold. First, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) is under sustained political pressure regarding com-
puter program-related inventions. Second, with regard to the section 112 require-
ments, the courts and the USPTO are grappling with the issue of exactly how
much disclosure is enough to satisfy the patent laws.
The software industry continues to grow every year. Currently, the United
States is leading the world in the development of computer program-based inven-
tions. For example, the personal computer software industry topped $7 billion in
*The authors are members of the firm of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox in Washington, D.C.
Collectively, they have been involved in the preparation and prosecution of several hundred applica-
tions involving computer-related inventions having significant software components.
**This article derives from a paper the authors presented at the Spring 1993 meeting of the Section
of International Law and Practice. The opinions expressed herein are those shared by the authors at
this time. They are not ascribed to Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox or extended beyond the confines
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1992.1 Consequently, although patent claims directed towards computer
program-related inventions are controversial in some circles, the patent commu-
nity continues to file thousands of patent applications directed towards this tech-
nology every year. For example, the number of filings in the USPTO has steadily
increased each of the last five years for technology relating to electrical computers
and processing systems. In 1988 approximately 4,000 patent applications were
filed in these classes, while in 1992 more than 7,500 patent applications were
filed.' Attorneys cannot ignore the fact that inventors continue to file patent
applications in the United States regardless of the increasing difficulty in obtaining
approval of these applications.
I. 35 U.S.C. Section 101-Statutory Subject Matter
One of the more controversial and confusing areas of patent law today is
statutory subject matter. The scope of statutory subject matter is encompassed
within section 101, which states that the right to obtain a patent is given to one
who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement thereof." A great
deal has been written during the last ten years on the subject of statutory subject
matter and how it should be applied to computer program-related inventions.
Despite the controversy, the courts, the USPTO, and patent attorneys are no
closer to a consensus on exactly what the scope of statutory subject matter should
be for computer program-related inventions.
Not too long ago, a patent attorney did not need to worry whether a computer
program-related invention was statutory subject matter in the United States. Be-
ginning in the early 1980s the USPTO relaxed (in a de facto fashion) its critical
interpretation of what constituted statutory subject matter with regard to computer
program-related inventions. As late as 1987 statutory subject matter was a dead
issue with respect to computer program-related inventions. The USPTO was
issuing patents for all types of claims (structure, means-plus-function, method,
user interface, computer program product, for example) directed towards com-
puter program-related inventions. Even the use of mathematical expressions in
the claims did not raise a statutory subject matter question in most cases.
This pattern changed, however, starting in 1987. Critics of computer
program-related patents started voicing their concerns, and spreading what we
considered to be misinformation in many cases. Both the critics of computer
program-related patents and governmental channels brought political pressure
on the USPTO. Consequently, the USPTO started rejecting claims based on
statutory subject matter basis more frequently. In September 1989, the
1. SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 20, 1993.
2. These figures were obtained from discussions with representatives of group 2300 of the
USPTO.
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USPTO, on its own initiative, published an article containing guidelines on
the patentability of computer program-related inventions in its Official Ga-
zette.3 The article analyzed all of the Supreme Court and Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) decisions concerning statutory subject matter
involving computer program-related or algorithm inventions. The article also
set forth a two-part test for determining whether a claim is directed to a nonstat-
utory mathematical algorithm.4 The test first requires a determination whether
the claim recites a mathematical algorithm. If it does, the test then holds that
the claim recites statutory subject matter only if the mathematical algorithm
applies to physical elements or process steps.
Two major schools of thought have emerged on the subject of computer
program-related inventions. The first, which is the majority view as well as our
own, is that computer program-related technology should not be treated any
differently in terms of statutory subject matter than computer hardware-related
technology. The second view, held by a minority, contends that computer
program-related technology is inherently different from hardware technology,
that it should not be deemed statutory subject matter, and that to do so will bring
dire consequences to the software industry.
The USPTO is responding to this pressure essentially by forcing the issue from
the Patent Office to Congress and the courts. Congress is unlikely to address this
issue. From a practical point of view, one cannot see how Congress can modify
the patent laws to deal specifically with computer program-related inventions.5
Thus, the problem will be left to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, a ruling by the Federal Circuit does not guarantee compliance
from the USPTO.6
Engineers and computer scientists who develop hardware and software technol-
ogy see no difference from a technical, business, or innovation point of view
between hardware-related and computer program-related inventions. In many
cases, the innovation that occurs in the computer program context is much greater
than that which occurs in the hardware context. The amount of money, time,
and effort the computer electronics industry is devoting to computer program
development as compared with hardware development has risen dramatically over
the last five years. Moreover, whether functionality is produced in hardware or
software is often a mere design choice.
3. 1106 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 5 (1989).
4. This analysis is known as the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for statutory subject matter.
5. See John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Soft-
ware, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 997 (1992) (advocating a separate legislative program for the protection
of computer software). A sui generis approach is no solution since it cannot keep up with the accelerat-
ing evolution of technology. An example of a failed sui generis protection scheme is the one covering
chip masks. 35 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
6. See, e.g., the USPTO response to In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Arrhythmia
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussed below).
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The patentability of computer program-related inventions is the result of a
series of Supreme Court decisions.7 Another important Supreme Court decision
that dealt with statutory subject matter (although in the biotechnology area) ob-
served that Congress intended section 101 to include "anything under the sun that
is made by man. 8
The battleground concerning whether computer program-related inventions
constitute patentable subject matter involves whether such inventions fall within
the specified classes of statutory subject matter set forth in section 101. Prior to
the Diehr decision, the USPTO broadly construed what was encompassed by
computer program-related inventions and took the position that computer
program-related inventions were not statutory subject matter.
In 1992 the Federal Circuit summarized the holdings in Benson and Flook as
follows:
In Gottschalk v. Benson the Court held that a patent claim that "wholly pre-empts" a
mathematical formula used in a general purpose digital computer is directed solely to
a mathematical algorithm, and therefore does not define statutory subject matter under
section 101.9
In Parker v. Flook the Court explained that the criterion for patentability of a claim
that requires the use of mathematical procedures is not simply whether the claim "wholly
pre-empts" a mathematical algorithm, but whether the claim is directed to a new and
useful process, independent of whether the mathematical algorithm required for its
performance is novel. 10
The 1981 Diehr decision dramatically changed the direction taken by Benson and
Flook. In Diehr the Supreme Court halted Benson's expansion. In so doing, the
Court stated:
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula
in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function
which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article
to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101."
In November 1989 the Federal Circuit handed down its first two decisions
relating to appeals from the USPTO on the issue of section 101 and computer-
7. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 663 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The
Supreme Court, in its landmark 1981 decision of Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), effectively
limited Benson and flook to their facts.
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
9. Commentators still argue whether Benson was decided correctly or should be overruled. One
commentator argues that although Benson did not articulate a rationale for its decision, there is a basis
in patent law for rejecting patents directed towards computer program-related technology. Pamela
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection forAlgorithms and Other Computer
Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990). In contrast, Donald S. Chisum, The
Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PiTT. L. REv. 959 (1986), argues that Benson should be overruled.
We agree with this leading patent law commentator.
10. Arrhythmia Research, Technology, Inc. v. Carazonix Corp., 958 F.2d at 1056 (citations
omitted; footnotes omitted).
11. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (emphasis added).
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related inventions. These decisions are In re Iwahashi2 and In re Grams, 3 and
many commentators view them as being inconsistent.
The rejected claims at issue in In re Grams were directed to a method. The
Federal Circuit held that a mere data gathering step was insufficient to render
them statutory. In In re Iwahashi the claims at issue were means-plus-function,
where structural relationships between the means clauses were found to exist and
a ROM was recited. The court held claims to be statutory. The Federal Circuit
in In re Iwahashi emphasized that means-plus-function claims should be inter-
preted in view of the specification.
The USPTO was hostile to the In re Iwahashi decision. In response, the USPTO
in March 1990 published another guideline' cautioning patent attorneys not to
overly rely on the In re Iwahashi decision. The USPTO stated that it would not
accept an interpretation of In re Iwahashi that would enable applicants to avoid
nonstatutory method rejections merely by drafting claims in "means for" format.
The guideline states that the current USPTO policy requires examiners to interpret
"means for" limitations broadly. Moreover, the USPTO requires applicants to
show that functionally defined means do not encompass all means for performing
the recited functions.
That the USPTO in writing and in practice is deliberately ignoring a Federal
Circuit decision is, to say the least, troublesome. The USPTO's rationale, ac-
cording to informal discussion with Patent Office officials, is that later decisions
by three-judge panels of the Federal Circuit cannot overrule prior case law. The
USPTO, according to its official line, is merely following the earlier cases, which
it states are inconsistent with the In re Iwahashi decision.
In March 1992 a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit handed down another
important decision relating to section 101. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc.
v. Corazonix Corp. 15 involved an appeal of a district court infringement case
declaring method and apparatus claims invalid for being nonstatutory. The claims
at issue were directed to the analysis of electrocardiographic signals in order to
determine certain characteristics of the heart function. In the opinion written by
Judge Newman the court held that the claims met the requirements of section 101.
The USPTO, although not officially so stating, takes the position that Arrhyth-
mia does not affect the standard of statutory subject matter of claims reciting
mathematical algorithm or computer program-related inventions.1 6 The USPTO
asserts that since Arrhythmia involved the issue of infringement, the theories and
analysis of the Federal Circuit do not apply in the statutory subject matter context.
12. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
13. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
14. 1112 Off. Gaz.oPat. Office 16 (1990).
15. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
16. See, e.g., Gerald Goldberg, Presentation of Computer Related Inventions, in 2 14TH ANNUAL
COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE 379, 379-410 (1992). Mr. Goldberg is Director of Group 2300 of the
USPTO.
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We disagree with this position. The standard for determining statutory subject
matter of claims does not change from the patentability to the infringement con-
text. Although the USPTO construes claims more broadly during prosecution
than courts interpret them in an infringement case, the statutory subject matter
analysis of Arrhythmia is valid and should be applied in the prosecution context
of computer program-related inventions. As such, we recommend that the patent
attorney quote from Arrhythmia during prosecution to build a record for appeal.
Although the USPTO may find arguments based on Arrhythmia unpersuasive, the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and the Federal Circuit will probably
be a better forum for such arguments. Outlined below are what we consider to
be some of the more important parts of Arrhythmia in the statutory subject matter
context.
After a thorough analysis of Supreme Court, CCPA, and prior Federal Circuit
decisions, the Arrhythmia court concluded that:
The law crystallized about the principle that claims directed solely to an abstract mathe-
matical formula or equation, including the mathematical expression of scientific truth
or a law of nature, whether directly or indirectly stated, are nonstatutory under section
101; whereas claims to a specific process or apparatus that is implemented in accordance
with a mathematical algorithm will generally satisfy section 101.
In applying this principle to an invention whose process steps or apparatus elements
are described at least in part in terms of mathematical procedures, the mathematical
procedures are considered in the context of the claimed invention as a whole.'7
The Arrhythmia court went on to emphasize the discussion in In re Abele:"8
[P]atentable subject matter [is not limited] to claims in which structural relationships or
process steps are defined, limited or refined by the application of the algorithm.
Rather, Walter should be read as requiring no more than that the algorithm be "applied
in any manner to physical elements or process steps," provided that its application is
circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution
activity. 19
That the Arrhythmia court did not ignore the preamble of the claim is important.
Indeed, the court states that the preamble is a claim limitation and should "not
[be] ignored in determining whether the subject matter as a whole is statutory,
for all of the claim steps are in implementation of this method." 20 The preamble
is the perfect place to emphasize for the examiner "what the claimed method steps
do rather than how the steps are performed.21
The court also stated that "[t]he view that 'there is nothing necessarily physical
about "signals" ' is incorrect." 22 This holding reaffirmed In re Taner,23 in which
17. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1057 (emphasis added).
18. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
19. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058.
20. Id. at 1059.
21. Ex Parte Logan, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1468 (1991) (emphasis in original; footnote
omitted).
22. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059 (citing In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 790 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
23. 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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the CCPA held that a method of seismic exploration including the mathematically
described steps of "summing" and "simulating from" was directed to statutory
subject matter. Although not always possible, if the claims can be drafted so that
signals are being manipulated or transformed, we recommend that the patent
attorney couch the claimed invention in terms of signals. At the very least, we
recommend using the term "signal," along with other correct terminology, in the
specification where appropriate. In that way the patent attorney can, if necessary,
amend the claims during prosecution to include the word "signal."
Under Benson it is important that any mathematical algorithm or formula not be
preempted. The patent attorney must limit the use of the mathematical algorithm or
formula to defined process steps and apparatus. The key question, "What did the
applicant invent?,"2 4 is the single most important one to ask during preparation
and prosecution of the computer program-related application. If the examiner
cannot answer this question after reviewing the claims, and the claims include a
direct or indirect recitation of a mathematical algorithm, one can expect to receive
a statutory subject matter rejection.
In meetings and interviews at the USPTO we have learned that examiners are
instructed to give section 101 rejections if they have any doubt about statutory
subject matter. In our experience the USPTO is making two types of section 101
rejections. The first deals with software per se, the second with the fact that
the computer program-related invention covers a mathematical algorithm. Both
rejections can be overcome in some cases, although claim amendment is often
necessary. By drafting the claims with the question "What did the applicant
invent?" in mind before the first office action, the probability of a statutory
subject matter rejection can be decreased.
The Arrhythmia court also discussed the fact that the final output in the claimed
invention was a number. The court stated that the fact "[tlhat the product is
numerical is not a criterion of whether the claim is directed to statutory subject
matter.,25 Once again, the court was recognizing that the claim as a whole must
be examined; because the final output of the invention was a number does not
mean it should be pigeonholed as nonstatutory subject matter.
In any computer program-related invention in which the process steps or appa-
ratus elements are described at least in part in terms of mathematical algorithms,
the USPTO must consider the claim "as a whole" as outlined in Diehr.26 There-
fore we recommend drafting the preamble and the body of the claims with func-
tional language that enables an examiner to understand the claimed invention "as
a whole." The patent attorney should make sure that the presentation of the
claims allows the examiner to understand at a high level "what the invention
is." Nevertheless, we remind the reader that the recitation of a "field of use
24. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
25. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060.
26. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981).
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limitation, ,21 "insignificant post-solution activity,' 28 or mere "data gathering" 29
cannot save a claim directed to nonstatutory subject matter.
The specification for computer-related inventions must also reflect this concept.
The patent attorney must draft the specification with statutory subject matter in
mind. Even if the entire invention is performed in software, the patent application
should include a high level illustration of the computer hardware on which the
computer program operates.
Moreover, the patent attorney must describe the invention at a high level.
Arguing that the claims as a whole satisfy the requirements of section 101 is always
easier if the specification describes the invention from a high level. Frequently, an
application describes the invention at such a low, specific level that the patent
attorney finds it difficult to claim the invention in anything other than mathematical
steps. This flaw can be fatal. By explaining any transformations that might take
place (whether they be the transformation of signals or other physical elements)
or by explaining how the mathematical algorithm is applied in any manner to
physical elements or process stelis, the patent attorney can avoid claiming only
the mathematical aspects of the invention.
Essential to a claim is that the computer program-related method be performed
in a computer environment. We therefore recommend insertion of thb words
"computer-based" before the word "method" in a claim. We also recommend
using "computer-based" before the words "system" and "apparatus." Although
all systems and apparatus meet the requirements of section 101, that may not be
obvious, especially when the system or apparatus claims are in means-plus-
function format.
If at all possible, the patent attorney should have system or apparatus claims
in the computer program-related application. We also recommend that the attor-
ney draft two sets of system or apparatus claims. The first set should use means-
plus-function form under section 112, paragraph 6.30 The second set should use
specific architecture and hardware components. For example, in In re Iwahashi
the court regarded a ROM to be "a specific piece of apparatus,' ' which required
that the claim be considered statutory subject matter since it did not wholly
preempt the use of the algorithm.
In order to claim a specific apparatus, the patent attorney should include in the
specification any possible hardware components that could be substituted for the
computer program-related modules-even if the patent attorney does not plan on
claiming the specific hardware. Once again, any recitation of hardware in the
27. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058.
28. Ex Parte Akamatsu, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919 (1992).
29. Grams, 888 F.2d at 840.
30. See Exparte Akamatsu, 22 U.S.PQ.2d (BNA) 1915 (1992) (means-plus-function claims that
differ from method claims only in "means for" terms before steps must be treated as indistinguishable
from method claims in determining whether method is statutory subject matter).
31. 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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specification, and especially in the claims, aids the patent attorney during prosecu-
tion. Once the USPTO rejects a claim under section 101, the patent attorney
cannot add hardware elements not specifically discussed in the specification.
The net result of the current confusion in the area of section 101 is that the
patent attorney should expect to see many more statutory subject matter rejections
than heretofore. By following the recommendations discussed above, however,
the patent attorney can avoid some section 101 rejections, and be in a better
position during prosecution to argue that the claims recite statutory subject matter.
On a final note, we believe that the community supporting computer program-
related patents must take concerted action to promote the Federal Circuit's under-
standing that the granting of such patents in the United States is critical for U.S.
industrial competitiveness. We believe that the USPTO has taken its tough position
to protect it from political pressure and to ease its workload. That stance is not
a proper application of patent law, particularly when some of the most significant
innovation presently occurring in the electronic industry comes from software
development.
II. Disclosure Requirements under Section 112, Paragraph 1
The first paragraph of section 112 requires that:
[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.32
The disclosure requirements for the specification-(1) written description and
enablement, and (2) the best mode-present the patent attorney with some of tue
more difficult questions concerning computer program-related inventions.
A. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENTS
The attorney must prepare a clear and concise patent application to fulfill the
written description and enablement requirements of section 112. For an attorney
to write the application seems only sensible. The difficulty lies in deciding how
much information and what type of information is needed to satisfy the written
description and enablement requirements under section 112. In this respect, com-
puter program-related inventions pose a greater challenge than hardware-related
inventions. Even more challenging is an application based on a foreign counterpart
application.
1. Amount of Information in the Specification
In determining the amount of information to include in an application the patent
attorney should opt for quality rather than quantity. Some will argue that the best
32. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (emphasis added).
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policy is to err on the side of caution and provide more information than is needed.
This approach sounds good in theory. In practice it is unrealistic because it
substantially raises a patent application's preparation and prosecution costs, not
only in the United States, but particularly abroad. Filing a case outside the United
States entails additional translation costs, excess page costs in the European Patent
Office, and significant fees (relevant to length) charged by the foreign patent
office and perhaps a foreign associate.
As stated by the Federal Circuit in In re Hayes Microcomputer Products Inc. 33 in
response to the appellant's argument that the core of a computer program-related
claimed invention was described in only twenty-seven lines: "Certainly no length
requirement exists for a disclosure to adequately describe an invention. While
some inventions require more disclosure, the adequacy of the description of an
invention depends on its content in relation to the particular invention, not its
length. "34
2. Level of Detail in the Specification
a. Computer Program, Listings
Generally, the patent application should include the computer program listing
(that is object, source, and pseudo-code listings) 35 only when the structure, func-
tionality, and operation of the computer program-related invention is impossible
to describe through the drawings and specification so that a person of ordinary
skill in the art could make or use the invention without undue experimentation
or additional invention. The Federal Circuit has addressed the issue of providing
information detailing computer programs for computer-based inventions at least
three times.
In White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc. 36 the Federal
Circuit held it necessary to disclose details of a computer program as of the filing
date of an application, since one skilled in the art could not develop the program
without undue experimentation. White involved a computer control system for
machine tools that employed a computer program called "SPLIT." At the time
of filing the patent application, SPLIT was a trade secret obtainable only by a
license fee. The court reasoned that if White could maintain SPLIT as a trade
secret, it could "theoretically extend its exclusionary rights beyond the 17 year
life of the patent by controlling access to SPLIT, a result inconsistent with the
objectives of the patent system." 37 That possibility therefore obliged White to
33. 982 F.2d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
34. Id. at 1534.
35. The industry uses a wide range of different terminology to define computer-related elements.
To ensure a level of consistency, we recommend that the patent attorney refer to JERRY M. ROSENBURG,
DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS, INFORMATION PROCESSING & TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1991), because
the USPTO uses its definitions during prosecution.
36. 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 791.
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disclose details of SPLIT "unless suitable substitutes were known and available
to those skilled in the art or unless a suitable substitute could be obtained without
undue experimentation. "3 The Federal Circuit excluded from consideration com-
mercial uses and publications available after the filing date because "[a] sufficient
disclosure must exist as of the application filing date."
39
White is distinguished in Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp. ,4 in which
the Federal Circuit reversed a district court holding that a "patent specification
did not contain an enabling disclosure of the software program used to carry out
the claimed invention, ,41 since the specification did not disclose such information.
The Federal Circuit held that enablement is determined from the viewpoint of a
skilled programmer and found "that it would be relatively straightforward for
a skilled computer programmer to design a program to carry out the claimed
invention. '"42 Additionally, the court stated:
When the challenged subject matter is a computer program that implements a claimed
device or method, enablement is determined from the viewpoint of a skilled programmer
using the knowledge and skill with which such a person is charged....
The claimed invention of the ... patent [in suit] is not in the details of the program
writing, but in the apparatus and method whose patentability is based on the claimed
combination of components or steps .... The possible design of superior software, or
whether each programmer would work out the details in the identical way, is not relevant
in determining whether the inventor has complied with the enablement requirement.4 3
As summarized by the Federal Circuit in Northern Telecom, "[a]lthough there
have been circumstances wherein production of the computer program was not
routine, as in White Consol. Indus. Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., where the
production of the program required one and one half to two person-years of work,
such circumstances were not shown or suggested for the '375 invention."4
Recently, Judge Lourie writing for the Federal Circuit in Hayes45 affirmed a
district court's holding that the disclosure adequately described the invention of
the challenged claims. At issue in Hayes was a "timing means.'"4 The appellant,
Ven-Tel, asserted that the term referred to a software timer whose structure was
not properly disclosed under the written-disclosure and best-mode requirements
of section 112, but instead maintained as a trade secret. The Federal Circuit
disagreed and stated that the written description of the invention contained in the
specification must allow one skilled in the art to recognize that the applicant
38. Id.
39. Id. at 792.
40. 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).
41. 908 F.2d at 941.
42. Id. at 941-42.
43. Id. at 941.
44. Id. at 942.
45. 982 F.2d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
46. Id. at 1533.
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invented what was claimed. In this case, the specification stated that the modem's
"decision making capability preferably resides in a microprocessor," 4 7 and the
applicant disclosed the preferred type of processor as a Z-8 type described in
publications by Zilog, Inc. Since evidence showed that one skilled in the art would
understand that the microprocessor's structure incorporated the timing means,
the appeals court held that substantial evidence supported the jury finding of
sufficient disclosure.
The Federal Circuit also disagreed with Ven-Tel's contention that section 112
required Hayes Microcomputer to disclose the actual software or "firmware"
that defined how a microprocessor functioned:
The evidence of record supports the conclusion that all that was required for one of
ordinary skill in the art to understand what the invention was and how to carry it
out was the disclosure of a microprocessor having certain capabilities and the desired
functions it was to perform. We disagree with Ven Tel's contention that to satisfy section
112, a statement as to the specific function of a microprocessor is inadequate, that the
actual program must be disclosed. While this may be true in some instances, this is not
such a case.48
A patent attorney may submit along with the specification an appendix with
program listings. 49 Such a listing appropriately includes the sequence of the in-
structions, routines, and other contents of a computer program. However, the
description of the operation and general content of computer program listings
must appear in the description portion of the specification.
Including computer program listings either in an appendix attached to the
specification or in the specification itself is not recommended. The Patent Office
does not require computer program listings. 50 From a practical point of view, the
Patent Office microfiches these computer program listings and does not print
them with the patent since they require too much paper. Also, patent attorneys
who believe they cover themselves by providing computer program listings may
rely too heavily on the listings as a basis for enablement. The Patent Office will
reject such an application under section 112, paragraph 1, for not meeting the
written description requirement, since computer program listings generally need
accompanying written description and drawings.
b. Drawings
A properly drafted computer program-related application should describe the
invention from the architectural, informational flow, and operational perspective,
47. Id. (emphasis omitted).
48. Id. at 1534.
49. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.96 (1992) and UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINATION PRocEDURE § 608.05 (1989) (hereinafter MPEP).
50. In discussions with Gerald Goldberg (Director of Group 2300) and Gary V. Harkcom and
Michael R. Flemming (Supervisory Patent Examiners in Group 2300) they stated that the examiners
in Group 2300 tend to view computer program listings as more of a hindrance than a help in the
majority of computer program-related patent applications they examine.
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and should explain the significant features and functions and the user interface,
if present.
At least two, and up to four, levels of figures should be used to represent
graphically these components of the invention. Conceptual representations at a
high level are needed. They allow for the invention to be claimed at that level.
They also provide a reader with an explanation at a conceptual level. This aspect
is particularly important for a lay person, such as a judge or a member of a jury,
who may have little to no idea of how to make or use the invention. Mid-level
representations also are important, for they provide the description that spans
the high-level conceptual representations and the low-level implementation or
best-mode representations.
As stated by the CCPA in Application of Ghiron, "functional-type block di-
agrams may be acceptable and, in fact, preferable if they serve in conjunction
with the rest of the specification to enable a person skilled in the art to make such
a selection and practice the claimed invention with only a reasonable degree of
routine experimentation."" 1
3. Overcoming USPTO Section 112 Enablement Rejections
Overcoming a rejection for lack of enablement under section 112 usually re-
quires a declaration or affidavit under rule 1.132.2 The steps for preparing an
affidavit are as follows: (1) Qualify the affiant as at least someone with "ordinary
skill in the art" ;53 (2) base all statements strictly on fact and do not make conclu-
sory statements; 54 and (3) make sure information alleged to be adequately de-
scribed and enabled is contained in the application and not solely in the affidavit.
5
B. BEST MODE
Establishing best mode requires a two-step inquiry: (1) did inventor know
of a best mode of practicing the invention at the time of filing the application
(subjective); and (2) did the inventor disclose the best mode in a manner that
would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the best mode
(objective).56
To avoid best-mode difficulties the patent attorney must ensure that all informa-
tion in the patent application is current as of the filing date-a requirement that
poses two problems to the attorney. First, some aspects of the invention are
typically more innovative than others and thus should be disclosed in greater
51. 442 F.2d 985, 991 (1971) (emphasis omitted).
52. 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (1992).
53. 442 F.2d at 991.
54. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (an expert's opinion on an ultimate legal issue
must be supported by something more than a conclusory statement in an affidavit).
55. Id.
56. In re Hayes, 982 F.2d 1527, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also In re Application of Sherwood,
613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, Diamond v. Sherwood, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
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detail. Second, programmers tend not to want to stop optimizing a program, and
continue to work on it up to the patent application's filing. Thus, the patent
attorney must work closely with the inventor until the actual filing and keep asking
the inventor, "Are there any special procedures to implement your invention or
a preferred apparatus or process to carry out your invention?"
In Hayes the best mode of implementing the invention was in firmware. The
inventor did not consider the specific firmware program listing he used to imple-
ment his invention to be any better than any other techniques described in the
specification. Rather, he believed the best mode of his invention was to store a
program listing in firmware. Thus, he was not required to disclose the firmware's
listings for a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention.57
Although in Hayes the "escape sequence" in firmware was a trade secret, the
Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of no
best-mode violation, because "[b]oth hardware and software timers are disclosed
in the specification, and ... neither type is necessarily better than the other.""
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit went on to say "[w]hile we agree that the
'302 patent only discloses the general function of the firmware without teaching
mathematical formulas, flow charts, or a firmware program listing, no more was
needed here. . . .[A] person of ordinary skill in the microprocessor art could
develop such a firmware listing." 59
A best-mode issue arises rarely in prosecution, but often in litigation. The
CCPA addressed best mode in a prosecution environment in In re Application of
Sherwood:
In general, writing a computer program may be a task requiring the most sublime of
the inventive faculty or it may require only the droning use of a clerical skill. The
difference between the two extremes lies in the creation of mathematical methodology
to bridge the gap between the information one starts with ... and the information that
is desired .... If these bridge-gapping tools are disclosed, there would seem to be no
cogent reason to require disclosure of the menial tools known to all who practice this
art.60
III. Means-Plus-Function under Section 112, Paragraph 6
Section 112's final paragraph authorizes means-plus-function limitations and
provides a statutory claim construction rule:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
6
'
57. Hayes, 982 F.2d at 1537.
58. Id. at 1538.
59. Id. at 1537.
60. 613 F.2d 809, 816-17 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, Diamond v. Sherwood, 450 U.S. 994
(1981) (footnote omitted).
61. 35 U.S.C § 112, para. 6 (1988).
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Paragraph 6 is a controversial provision of section 112 as it relates to computer
program-based inventions. It raises the questions: Should mean-plus-function
claims be interpreted as method claims in the software arena? How should means-
plus-function claims be analyzed under the doctrine of equivalents in an infringe-
ment action? This article addresses only the first question.
It is possible that the Federal Circuit will resolve questions surrounding statutory
subject matter under section 101 and means-plus-function under section 112 in In
re Alappat,62 which was scheduled to be heard en banc in April of 1993. It is ques-
tionable at this time whether the Federal Circuit will decide Alappat under substan-
tive issues, because of significant procedural issues involved (see below).
A. BACKGROUND OF PROCEEDINGS
Alappat filed an application for a patent on January 29, 1988, Serial No. 07/
149,792, for a "Raster Scan Wave Form Display Rasterizer With Pixel Intensity
Gradation." 63 The examiner rejected claims 15-19 as unpatentable under section
101 because they were directed to nonstatutory subject matter under the mathemat-
ical algorithm exception."
On appeal before the Board of Appeals and Patent Interferences (Board), the
Board reversed the examiner's decision. The Board held that claim 15, directed
to a rasterizer in means-plus-function terms, was statutory even though it recited
a mathematical algorithm because the claim as a whole was directed to an appara-
tus. In reaching the section 101 decision, the panel construed the means recited
in a claim pursuant to section 112, paragraph 6 as corresponding to the hardware
structure disclosed in the specification. 65
62. 980 F.2d 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
63. Ex Parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (1992). A rasterizer is an electronic device
that converts wave-form magnitude data into an array of intensity data for use in creating a smooth
wave-form display. Overall, the claimed rasterizer controls the display connecting the digitized
samples of the wave-form by giving a greater illumination intensity for pixels lying squarely on the
wave-form trace and a lesser intensity for pixels lying along an edge of the trace. The physical effect
is to create the visual appearance of a smooth, continuous wave-form. It accomplishes this by operation
of a combination of conventional electronic hardware circuits.
An arithmetic logic unit (ALU) determines the vertical distance between the end-points of each
vector created by successive data points of the input signal. A counter and ALU determine the
"elevation" or location of a row of pixels with respect to the input vector. Barrel shifters, under
control of priority encoder, normalize the vertical distance and elevation determined by the ALUs.
The normalized vertical distance and elevation are used to address read-only memories (ROM) which
contain lookup tables that provide illumination intensity data.
64. Claim 15 is listed below as follows:
15. A rasterizer for converting vectors in a data list representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into
anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means comprising:
(a) means for determining the vertical distance between the endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined function of the normalized vertical
distance and elevation.
Id. at 1341.
65. Id. at 1340.
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The panel relied on prior CCPA and Federal Circuit decisions involving the
section 101 issue (including Arrhythmia) as authority for interpreting the claims
as a whole in light of the corresponding structure described in the specification.
The panel expressly distinguished the USPTO practice of viewing the claims as
not limited to the specification.
After the examiner moved for reconsideration, 66 the Commissioner added five
members to the original panel. On April 22, 1992, the expanded Board held that
means-plus-function claims may be treated as indistinguishable from method
claims for statutory subject matter determination, despite the requirements in
section 112, paragraph 6 that such claims be examined in light of disclosed
structures. Refusing to read into the claim structures recited in the specification,
the Board concluded that a "means for" claim for a rasterizer should be treated
as a method that recites a nonstatutory mathematical algorithm that reads on
nonspecific apparatus. The three Board members who sat on the original panel
wrote a dissent, arguing that Arrhythmia required that the statutory nature of a
"means for" claim be determined with reference to the description in the patent
specification.67
The expanded Board declined to follow the In re Iwahashi court's approach to
resolving the section 101 issue, by referring to the specification to interpret
means-plus-function elements pursuant to section 112, paragraph 6 calling it
dictum, and limited the holding in In re Iwahashi to its facts (recital of a ROM
in the claim). 68 The dissent recited Arrhythmia as reinforcing its reliance on In
re lwahashi.69 The majority, however, dismissed Arrhythmia as differing both
in claim language and context, stating that the rules of claim construction in
infringement actions differed from the rules for claim interpretation during prose-
cution.7 °
B. ISSUES
The case raises a number of issues for the Federal Circuit to consider when it
hears the appeal en banc:
(1) Does claim 15 recite patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. section
101 when the claim is written in means-plus-function format pursuant to
section 112, paragraph 6 based on a hardware disclosure of digital circuitry
in the specification?
(2) When a three-member panel of the Board has rendered its decision, does
the Commissioner have the authority to constitute a new panel for purposes
of reconsideration of the first decision?
66. Pursuant to the MPEP, supra note 49, § 1214.04.
67. Id. at 1344-47.
68. Id. at 1345.
69. Id. at 1350 (dissent).
70. Id. at 1347.
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(3) If the Commissioner lacks such authority, does such a decision of the Board
constitute a decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. section 1295(a)(4)(A)? If
not, does this court have jurisdiction to reach the merits of the appeal
decision?
(4) What is the relationship, if any, between the "reconsideration" action
taken in this case and "rehearings" by the Board provided for in 35 U.S.C.
section 7(b)?
C. THE RAMIFICATIONS
In Exparte Alappat the Patent Office asserted a section 101 rejection under the
mathematical algorithm basis against a hardware-based invention. Unfortunately,
this decision is not an isolated one. Our personal experience is that we are receiving
Alappat-type rejections against purely hardware inventions, and our colleagues
at leading electronic and computer companies tell us that they also are receiving
such section 101 rejections. The question to ponder is how far will the Patent
Office extend these section 101 rejections before the Federal Circuit brings some
rational analysis back into the situation?
IV. Conclusion
Computer program-related inventions have been, and will continue to be, the
driving force for productivity enhancement in the electronics industry. At present,
the USPTO's interpretation of the case law surrounding 35 U.S.C. sections 101
and 112 creates a hostile environment in which to prosecute computer program-
related inventions. The Federal Circuit and the USPTO appear to have a different
understanding of what constitutes statutory subject matter. Furthermore, the
USPTO appears to be treating means-plus-function and method claims directed
to computer program-related inventions as indistinguishable. Under the given
conditions the patent attorney needs to describe and claim the invention in clear,
concise terms to facilitate an understanding of the invention as a whole, and at
the same time meet the written description, enablement, and best-mode require-
ments of the U.S. patent laws.
In conclusion, we expect that the Federal Circuit in the next few years will
restore a rational analysis to the sections 101 and 112 issues concerning computer
program-related inventions. Until then, the prudent course of action for the inno-
vator of computer program-related technology is to file applications seeking broad
and strong patent protection and to wait out the controversy at the USPTO. The
resulting patent protection will be worth the cost, time, and effort.
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